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Introduction
In Germany, as well as in many other Western societies, the mean educational attainment of the population has constantly increased over the past decades. At the same time, the phenomenon of overeducation, a situation in which individuals have more education than they need for their jobs, has become increasingly relevant.
Overeducation is an extensively discussed topic in the economic literature (for an overview, see Hartog, 2000; Sicherman, 1991) . The consequences of overeducation were analyzed in dierent settings including wage (Sicherman, 1991; Groeneveld and Hartog, 2004) and job satisfaction (Battu, Beleld, and Sloane, 1999) regressions.
Although the topic has been analyzed in a vast amount of studies and over a long period of time, several conceptual issues still remain unsolved. While the operationalization of over-and undereducation has received substantial attention (see e.g. Verdugo and Verdugo, 1989; Rubb, 2003) , the issue of causality has been addressed only recently (see e.g. Bauer, 2002; Korpi and Tahlin, 2009 ). However, understanding the causality in the relationship between educational match and wages is a necessary prerequisite for a complete understanding of the underlying mechanisms. This study addresses the problem of unobserved heterogeneity, which is still a common concern in this eld of literature. As the explanation of the eects of mismatches is still inconclusive in the literature, this paper directly contributes to this discussion.
The standard way of operationalizing the educational mismatch framework compares the educational attainment of an individual to the educational attainment of workers in the same occupation (classical OMU framework). This framework was introduced by Duncan and Homan (1981) and has become widely accepted in the mismatch literature (e.g. Rubb, 2003) . The OMU model explicitly dierentiates between all three possible educational matches: overeducation (O), educational match (M) and undereducation (U), all of these states measured in years of education. OLS results, which are remarkably stable over nearly all studies in this eld, show that overeducation has a positive signicant eect on wages. Hence, overeducated individuals earn more than those less educated who are in the same occupation. However, the positive overeducation eect is signicantly smaller than the eect of matched years of education. Hence, overeducated individuals are disadvantaged in terms of wages compared to others with the same education who are in a better match. Undereducation is either signicantly negative or insignicant (a summary is found in Hartog, 2000) . Even less consensus exists regarding the role of unobserved heterogeneity.
Using overeducation in classical OLS wage regressions relies on the assumption that equally educated individuals have the same innate ability and thereby productivity 4 (given other controls). However, this is a very strong assumption and has been criticized in mismatch studies lately (Bauer, 2002; Korpi and Tahlin, 2009 ). There are three ways of solving this problem: Fixed eects regressions (Bauer, 2002) , the use of instruments (Korpi and Tahlin, 2009 ) and the direct inclusion of ability controls (Korpi and Tahlin, 2009 ). Each of these approaches has strengths and weaknesses (a discussion of the these approaches can be found in section 3). Therefore, concentrating on one of them alone involves the danger of interpreting results that are heavily driven by the model assumptions. I compare the results of three dierent methods oering a broad and robust base for interpretation.
The controversy regarding the role of unobserved heterogeneity leads to a problem in the interpretation of the underlying causes of the ndings. A prominent approach is the human capital hypothesis (Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1988) , which was tested for the German labor market by Bauer (2002) . The idea is that mismatched individuals are in a "bad match" regarding their formal education because they compensate for disadvantages in their innate ability. When controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in the estimations, the coecients of all three states should come close to each other to prove this hypothesis. Bauer (2002) nds that the compensation hypothesis cannot be completely rejected for Germany.
In the rst part of the analysis, I replicate the OLS wage regressions with my sample.
These standard OLS regressions replicate the ndings that are established in the literature. However, there might be bias due to unobserved heterogeneity. Fixed eects results hint at the validity of the human capital compensation hypothesis as also found by Bauer (2002) using the same data set. However, IV regressions show that unobserved heterogeneity does not explain wage dierences between years of required education and years of over-/undereducation unambiguously. Using an IV approach on SOEP data and including formerly unobserved skills as proxies of innate ability by using data from the IALS shows that dierences between educational match and mismatch even become larger and only the years of required education matter, while years of overeducation do not have any signicant wage eect. The nding that overeducation does not pay o in terms of wages neglects the explanation that mismatched workers compensate for skill shortages. These results show a structural problem in the German educational system because many individuals stay in the educational sector longer than they need to perform their future tasks. This imposes high costs for individuals, as they face foregone wages, as well as for the society because education is publicly funded to a large extend in Germany.
This analysis contributes to the economic literature in several dimensions: (1) By applying three dierent strategies of dealing with unobserved heterogeneity, it oers the most comprehensive study on the causal eects of overeducation in Germany; (2) the results contrast former results for the German labor market, oering a new line of argumentation; (3) this is of huge political relevance at it identies a large-scale problem in the allocation of individuals in the educational sector and in the labor market.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 places this study in the existing literature, section 3 explains the empirical methods applied. Section 4 introduces the dataset used and explains the key variables. In section 5, the empirical results are explained and discussed, a conclusion can be found in section 6.
Literature
Educational mismatch has received substantial attention in the economic literature, mainly from an empirical point of view. Although already analyzed from various dierent angles, there are still gaps to be lled. Neither has the problem of unobserved heterogeneity been solved conclusively, nor has an explanation of the empirical ndings in the literature found broad acceptance. Duncan and Homan (1981) started the modern empirical mismatch literature by introducing a framework in which individual education consists of three parts: Education required for a job, overeducation and undereducation. This was the starting point of the OMU theory. A well-matched worker has exactly the years of education required in his job (M); overeducated workers attained additional years of education which are not needed for their current working life (O); undereducated workers received less education than required to do their jobs (U).
By decomposing obtained education into these three parts, it is possible to analyze if education generally pays o in the labor market or if it matters whether this education is used productively in an educational match. The OMU framework has become the standard approach in the overeducation literature and is, for example, used by Sicherman (1991); Rumberger (1987) ; Alba-Ramirez (1993); Bauer (2002) ; Hartog and Oosterbeek (1988) and Korpi and Tahlin (2009) .
While these studies dier regarding their denition of overeducation, the datasets applied and the countries and time periods studied, they all share a common nding, which has become a stylized fact in the mismatch literature. Required education is positively associated with wages, the same is true for overeducation but the overeducation coecient is signicantly smaller. Undereducation is normally negative 6 and signicant but this nding is not as robust as the other two (for an extensive meta-analysis of the literature, see Hartog, 2000; Rubb, 2003) .
The classical ndings of mismatch studies are mainly based on OLS wage regressions.
However, more recent papers have started using dierent regression techniques to tackle a possible problem of earlier studies: unobserved heterogeneity. Studies by Bauer (2002) and Korpi and Tahlin (2009) assume that unobserved heterogeneity biases OLS results, and discuss this in the context of the human capital theory. This theory assumes that educational mismatch is not a result of a structural mismatch of skill demand and supply in the labor market but mismatched workers compensate for ability not captured by the educational attainment.
Overeducated workers lack ability and compensate for this by getting more education than they actually need to perform their job. The opposite is true for undereducated workers. As they have a higher innate ability than others, they can get better jobs without having the required educational attainment.
According to Bauer (2002) , this assumption is proven right when the coecients of the three components of education become more equal when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Using data from the German SOEP, he nds that this hypothesis cannot be generally rejected for Germany as the coecients become similar in size using panel models. Korpi and Tahlin (2009) do not only apply these panel models but also an IV model and a direct inclusion of skills. In their comprehensive approach, they reject the human capital theory but they state that in their instrumental approach, they are concerned with a weak instrument problem.
Using the SOEP, which runs over a longer period of time, I can get more robust results from panel models and thereby replicate the results found by Bauer (2002) . I then extend this study by following the strategy of Korpi and Tahlin (2009) , applying an IV approach and including skill measures directly. I use dierent instrument variables to avoid the abovementioned weak instrument problem. In a further step, I apply data from the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS), a dataset explicitly designed to model skills. By using this dataset, I can directly include these skills to proxy ability in the OMU regressions and thereby avoid unobserved heterogeneity. Using this strategy, I contrast the results by Bauer (2002) and oer a dierent explanation for the existence of overeducation in the German labor market.
Estimation Method
Dierent estimation methods are applied in this analysis to identify causal eects. The starting point for wage analyses are Mincer wage regressions (Mincer, 1970) . This approach is adjusted by including the variables for required education, overeducation and undereducation. All of these variables are measured in years. This gives the wage regression for the classical OMU framework (e.g. Hartog, 2000) :
with the logarithm of hourly wage ln(w it ) as the dependent variable. The main explanatory variables are educational match (M), overeducation (O) and undereducation (U) in years. The matrix x it includes further controls such as a polynomial in age, a dummy for the birth cohort, tenure, the number of children and marital status, nights spent in hospital as control for individual health, a dummy for fulltime employment as well as industry and year dummies. ε it is the error term. The question arising here is how to operationalize overeducation. Basically, there are three dierent options: (1) An objective approach relying on an expert valuation; (2) a subjective approach relying on workers' self assessment; (3) an empirical approach. The rst option is mainly used in US studies (e.g. Rumberger, 1987; McGoldrick and Robst, 1996) . The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) for the US labor market provides the necessary information, such as information on occupations and the required education for these occupations. This assessment is made by labor market experts. An analogous does not exist for Germany. However, its unavailability is not the only reason not to use the "expert" method. Kiker, Santos, and de Oliveira (1997) point out that this measure can only work if updated regularly to account for technological change as well as hiring standards. If not updated regularly, this measure increasingly tends to misclassify respondents over time. The subjective approach (e.g. Sicherman, 1991; Sloane, Battu, and Seaman, 1999) has the advantage over the expert valuation of being updated automatically with each wave of a panel dataset. Respondents are asked for the qualication necessary to do their job and the answer is compared to the actually attained education to evaluate whether a person is in an educational match or not. However, this denition gives rise to other problems. The main criticism of this approach is that it remains unclear which benchmark is used by respondents. They could either use the qualication necessary to actually perform the job, or they could answer according to hiring standards (Bauer, 2002) . Whichever answer they give, it requires respondents to know about the standards in their occupational eld in detail.
This study applies the empirical method of measuring overeducation, which was applied by e.g. Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) ; Kiker, Santos, and de Oliveira (1997) and Bauer (2002) . Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) introduced this measure by using the mean value for each occupation. Overeducated workers are those individuals whose education exceeds the mean value plus one standard deviation, undereducated are those whose education lies below the mean value minus one standard deviation. This approach oers several advantages over the ones discussed before: Firstly, it is naturally updated regularly, similar to the subjective approach. Secondly, it does not have the weakness of the subjective approach as it does not rely on an individual evaluation but on the distribution observed in the labor market. However, the use of a range of one standard deviation was criticized as arbitrary choice (Bauer, 2002) and the method was shown to be prone to outliers (Kiker, Santos, and de Oliveira, 1997) . Kiker, Santos, and de Oliveira (1997) also used the empirical method but instead of relying on the mean value, they used the modal value within an occupation. This approach keeps the advantages of the approach by Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) without being prone to its abovementioned weaknesses. Within the course of this analysis, this modal value approach is applied.
The analysis starts with classical OLS wage regressions. However, they fail to provide causal eects because of unobserved heterogeneity. Applying OLS regressions requires the assumption that workers only dier by their observed characteristics, which is highly doubtful. As argued in the more recent literature on mismatch (Bauer, 2002; Korpi and Tahlin, 2009) , unobserved inuences such as intelligence, productivity and motivation are important factors when analyzing mismatch. This analysis uses three dierent approaches to tackle the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. Bauer (2002) points out that using panel data, it is possible to estimate xed eects regressions to control for unobserved inuences. This approach is reproduced in this study. The wage regressions presented above remain the same, however, using the panel nature of the SOEP, individual xed eects are controlled for. While this strategy controls for unobserved heterogeneity, it introduces another problem. Only individuals changing their educational match within the observation period can be used in xed eects regressions, which implies that many mismatch observations cannot be regarded within the analysis. To account for this problem, an IV approach is used. Within the mismatch context, this was done by Korpi and Tahlin (2009) , who also point to the diculty of using an IV approach in the OMU framework: All three education variables, overeducation, undereducation and the re-quired education must be instrumented. Hence, at least three instruments have to be found that fulll the criteria of instrumental variables; all instruments have to be correlated with the instrumented variable (relevance) while they must not aect the outcome variable over a dierent channel (validity). Korpi and Tahlin (2009) apply four instruments in their analysis, all of them related to the respondents' youth: the number of siblings, place of residence, economic problems and family disruption. While the authors argue that these instruments are valid, they fail to fulll the relevance criterion.
Applying instrumental variable approaches to account for unobserved heterogeneity in education studies is not a new idea. Angrist and Krueger (1991) use information on the quarter of birth on US census data. Card (1993) famously uses the proximity of the place of residence to the nearest college, which was later shown to be a weak instrument (for a discussion, see Harmon, Oosterbeek, and Walker, 2003) . As already pointed out, unlike studies on the eects of education in general, this analysis requires three dierent instruments to cover all three possible matches.
The rst, also used by Korpi and Tahlin (2009) , is in line with a study by Butcher and Case (1994) , using the presence of siblings. I basically follow their reasoning by including the number of siblings as an instrument for the educational match. The number of siblings is negatively correlated with the years of education. This is due to a split of parental support and expectations on several children. Parents can be assumed to lay a strong focus on the educational career of single children and this focus shifts, the higher the number of siblings, causing a lack of parental support during education (Butcher and Case, 1994) . The data support this, as the number of siblings is negatively correlated with overeducation and the achieved education, while it is positively correlated with the case of undereducation.
The second instrument applied is also in line with studies stressing the family background, like Harmon and Walker (2000) . Following Korpi and Tahlin (2009) , an indicator for family disruption is applied. The number of years living without the biological parents until the age of 16 is used as an instrument, following a similar reasoning as for the number of siblings. The more time spent living with the biological parents, the higher the support and achievements in the educational career. For the third instrument, I use macro changes for exogenous variation. Often used are schooling reforms (e.g. Walker, 1995, 1999; Pons and Gonzalo, 2002) . However, as the data applied here cover a long time and observations from all age groups, schooling reforms cannot be used. Instead, I apply labor market conditions at the respondents' age of 15. This is a time in which individuals decide (1) to stay in the academic track; (2) to leave for the labor market aiming at a more applied vocational education; (3) not to obtain any further education 1 .
A high unemployment rate at this time is likely to inuence individuals to stay in the schooling system as an outside option to entering the labor market, which does not oer good opportunities at that time. The data do indeed support this hypothesis. While these three variables all have an inuence on the educational decision and thereby on the educational match, they do not have other wage eects. All three instruments used in the analysis refer to living conditions while respondents are in education. This is the theoretical basis for the eect the instruments have on the education variables, which is also veried by statistical tests. While the amount of education is clearly inuenced by these living conditions, there is no other channel to be found over which the instruments aect the hourly wages in later life.
Fixed eects regressions have the abovementioned weakness of missing individuals not changing their educational match. This problem is avoided by IV regressions. As a robustness check, a third method of dealing with the problem of unobserved heterogeneity is applied. In this approach, innate ability, which is unobserved to the researcher, is directly modeled in the regressions by including a proxy. In the OMU framework, Korpi and Tahlin (2009) make an approach to do this by including measures of health and verbal ability to capture this dimension. However, including proxies does not change their results signicantly. In the SOEP, there is no direct measure of ability included. I therefore use data from the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) by the OECD. This dataset includes information on workrelated reading, writing and math skills. These measure ability of individuals from a more applied perspective than the formal educational attainment and can be used as proxies for innate ability.
Applying the FE approach, I can reproduce the ndings by Bauer (2002) . In a second step, the use of instruments for the educational match avoids the problem of xed eects regressions in education studies and refutes previous results. To test the stability of these new ndings for Germany, I use data from the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) and include reading, writing and math skills as proxy for innate ability.
Data
The data used in the rst part of this analysis is from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), one of the longest running representative panel-datasets in Europe. Established in 1984, it covers more than 20,000 individuals per year and is representative of the German population (Wagner, Frick, and Schupp, 2007) 2 .
The sample is restricted to working individuals between 18 and 65 and covers the years 1991 -2011. I exclude individuals who lived in Eastern Germany before German reunication as well as immigrants who came to Germany after their 10th birthday. These restrictions ensure that respondents were educated in the same educational system and results are not driven by a dierent perception of educational titles from other countries. This proceeding replicates Bauer (2002) , who also uses SOEP data for his analysis of educational mismatch. The health control shows nearly equal values for men and women. Labor market specic controls show that tenure is about three years higher for men, at about 12 years. Men are most likely fulltime employed (94%), while a little more than half of the women in the sample work fulltime.
In Table 2 , descriptive statistics for the main interest variables in the OMU framework can be found. To derive results which show the situation in Germany as precise as possible, I avoid using a standard education variable in the SOEP, which oers mapped information on the years of education. 3 This variable assigns each individual the years of education typically necessary to obtain the highest achieved degree. For example, leaving education after the A levels (Abitur) means having 13 years of education, a vocational education means further 1.5 -2 years, a university education 5 further years. While this is a useful tool for many applications, it does not fully meet the requirements of this study. Especially for higher educated individuals, this leads to measurement problems. For the mapped variable, the standard period of studies is used. This, however, is likely to be extended, the higher the educational degree. For a vocational education, which follows a 2-pillar strategy in Germany with school participation and an applied education in the labor market, there are dierent possibilities regarding the length of education. Degrees from universities and polytechnics are in many cases not achieved within the standard period. This can lead to an underestimation of the attained years of education and thereby to an incorrect measure of over-and undereducation. Therefore, I use the spell data in the SOEP. Education spells within the sample period are directly observed. For education spells before entering the sample, I use data from the biography questionnaire. Respondents entering the SOEP ll in a questionnaire stating their main activity (e.g. in education, employed, unemployed) for each year since their 15th birthday. This information is used to derive the overall years of education respondents have really spent in education 4 . Table 3 shows the results of the wage regressions for the pooled sample. The rst column shows the results from OLS wage regressions using the OMU framework. The classical OMU nding, i.e. positive returns to overeducation, which are lower than the positive returns to required education, and negative returns to undereducation, is remarkably stable across countries and datasets (Hartog, 2000) . It is therefore not surprising that this result can also be found here. The OLS regressions show positive returns to overeducation of 2% per year of overeducation. The returns to the years of required education are about 7.5% and signicantly higher. The negative eect of undereducation is nearly 5% per year. All coecients are highly signicant and in line with the previous literature.
Applying xed eects changes the results drastically. The coecient for the required education within an occupation becomes smaller (0.053). The coecients for years of over-and undereducation are larger than in the OLS regressions. The wage benet for a year of overeducation is 4.7% and thereby nearly the same as the one for years of required education. Hence, the dierence between these two inuences nearly vanishes here. The coecient for years of undereducation is also larger than in the OLS case, showing a wage penalty of more than 7% per year. All coecients remain highly signicant. These ndings are similar to the xed eects results by Bauer (2002) , who also uses the SOEP, but for a dierent observation period.
These results hint at the validity of the assumption that there is compensation taking place, at least for overeducated workers. When controlling for unobserved heterogeneity using individual xed eects, the coecients for years of required education and overeducation become closer to each other, as expected in this theory. However, the FE method to control for unobserved factors has some weaknesses in this context. Only individuals changing their match are observed as all non-changers are timeinvariant and therefore not included in the panel model. Changing the match means (1) changing the job; (2) an overall shift of the requirements in the job; (3) going back to education. All of these cases are rather special, while many cases in which individuals do not change their match over the sample period cannot be observed. Also, the concentration on those changers is problematic as there might be other unobserved factors underlying these changes.
The third column of Table 3 shows the results for the IV regressions. Here, the dierence to the OLS results is even larger. Returns to years of overeducation are negative but insignicant. This implies that the pattern clearly diers from the OLS and FE ndings. The returns to years of required education are higher than in the previous regressions (0.107). The coecient for years of undereducation is much larger than in the previous regressions and still highly signicant. The eect is noticeably large, which can be explained by two arguments: (1) IV regressions are less precise than OLS regressions (Wooldridge, 2000) , which leads to larger condence intervals and makes the point estimates less meaningful; (2) while the rst-stage regressions 5 and Angrist-Pischke multivariate F test of excluded instruments (Angrist and Pischke, 2008) suggest that the instruments are strong for all three education components, the value for the undereducation case is much smaller (an F-value of 20) than for the other two match variables. There is a signicant correlation of the instruments with the endogenous variable to be seen but this is not as strong as in the overeducation and required education cases. For these reasons, I do not interpret the magnitude of the undereducation point estimates.
The results of the FE as well as the IV regressions point at a bias in the OLS results. However, the direction of the bias is ambiguous. While the FE results suggest that OLS results are biased downwards, IV results suggest that the overeducation coecient is overestimated, leading to very dierent conclusions. While the FE ndings back the theory of human capital compensation, the IV results hint at a structural problem in the German labor market. Only years of education really required in a job pay o, while any additional education does not. This means that education over and above what is required is not productive in the labor market, otherwise employers would pay for it. At the same time, overeducation is a widespread phenomenon. Hence, education is attained which then remains unproductive in the labor market. This means a huge waste of public resources as well as individual eort in the educational sector. As the two explanations dier gravely, I shed further light by splitting the sample to see whether there are dierent patterns for men and women. Table 4 shows the results for the male sample and the pattern found for the pooled sample is reproduced. The OLS results in column 1 reveal the classical pattern of OMU studies. In the FE regression, the coecients for required education and overeducation become close to each other while the undereducation coecient remains mainly unchanged. IV results (column 3) show that the overeducation coecient becomes negative and insignicant, while the required education eect becomes larger and remains statistically signicant. Undereducation remains negative and also becomes larger, however, it is statistically insignicant. Hence, the ndings for the male sample are nearly the same as for the pooled one. Table 5 shows results for female respondents. Once again, the pattern found before is conrmed. In the OLS regressions, required education has a larger eect than overeducation while this changes in the FE regression. The overeducation eect becomes larger, the required education eect becomes smaller and both become closer to each other. While this nding again seems to conrm the compensation hypothesis, the IV results show a very dierent pattern, rather supporting the theory of a general matching problem between the educational supply and demand.
All in all, the results of the wage regressions show some remarkable ndings. The OLS wage regressions reveal the expected results. The FE results do not conrm this general nding completely as the dierence between overeducation and required education is not found anymore. This is very similar to the ndings by Bauer (2002) and supports the theory explaining educational mismatch as a form of compensation for other forms of ability. The IV results, however, reject this hypothesis by showing that the eect of matched years of education becomes larger than in the other regressions while the overeducation eect becomes insignicant, the point estimate even negative. This backs the theory of an allocation problem as many individuals acquire education which then is not used in the labor market.
As the FE and IV regressions show dierent results, I expand the empirical strategy and apply a third strategy, to ensure the robustness of the IV ndings. Here, I
proxy ability with reading, writing and math skills and include these in the OMU regressions. Unfortunately, I cannot achieve this by using data from the SOEP because there is no ability measure included. Instead, I use data from the International Adult Literacy Survey. This is a joint project of the OECD and Statistics Canada 6 .
In 1994, representative samples from European and Northern American countries were interviewed with the aim of getting a comprehensive picture of skills among adults, exceeding the measure of formal educational attainment. These include numeracy as well as literacy prociency. Using the observations from this dataset from Germany, it is possible to include skill measures as proxies for ability in the OMU framework directly. Unlike the SOEP, the IALS data is a cross-section and not a panel. However, including the skill measures directly, the panel dimension is expendable for this step of the analysis. The dataset does not include a continuous wage variable but wage quintiles. This changes the econometric approach. I apply three dierent models to guarantee that the results are not driven by the choice of the model. Firstly, I estimate a linear OLS model with the wage as 5-digit variable.
As the dependent variable is the wage and not a classical categorical variable, the assumption of linearity is not supposed to cause problems. However, to ensure this, I estimate an ordered logit as second model. In a third step, I apply an interval regression. 7 As the econometric framework is dierent, the data set is much smaller and I do not have the whole set of standard wage-regression control variables, I do not interpret coecients quantitatively. However, they can show the direction of the ndings. Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics of the IALS data.
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The sample is evenly distributed by sex. Required education is around 11 years, which is lower than in the SOEP sample. This is due to the construction of the variable, as I cannot use a measure as precise as the one derived from the SOEP spell data. The years of required education are closer to the mapped SOEP variable of years of education. 80% of the respondents have not changed their employer in the last 12 month, which serves as a proxy for tenure. The numeracy and literacy skills are self-assessed on a scale from 1 (excellent ) to 4 (poor ). Mean literacy skills are a little better than numeracy skills, with reading skills closest to excellent. Table 7 shows the results of the IALS regressions without including ability controls. The general pattern of the OMU literature and the previous OLS regressions is reproduced. Overeducation has a positive signicant coecient, required education is also positively signicant and larger. Undereducation does not have a negative coecient here but it still has the lowest point estimate and is insignicant. Table 8 presents the results controlling for numeracy and literacy skills. In all three models, the eect of overeducation becomes smaller and loses signicance, in the OLS and ordered logit models it stays weakly signicant at the 10% level, in the interval regression it becomes statistically insignicant. The coecients of required education remain positive and highly signicant, so the gap between the coecients of overeducation and required education widens. This diers from the previous FE ndings but is in line with the IV ndings. The results from the IALS sample show that the classical OMU ndings can be reproduced without ability controls. When controlling for ability directly, the results change signicantly into the direction of the IV results for the SOEP sample. This means they reject the human capital compensation theory. Instead, they show an allocation problem in the labor market with many individuals spending a long time in education, accumulating human capital which then is not used productively in the labor market.
Conclusion
This paper analyses the causal eects of educational mismatch on wages in Germany using data from the SOEP and the IALS. Educational mismatch is dened as a situation in which individuals have more or less formal education than the modal value within an occupation (empirical denition of mismatch). OLS results conrm the previous ndings of this eld of literature. As more recent studies on the wage eects of over-/undereducation have found, these results might be biased due to unobserved heterogeneity (Bauer, 2002; Korpi and Tahlin, 2009) . Taking this into account, I apply a xed eects approach, an IV approach and use data from the IALS to model skills as proxies for ability in the regression framework directly. Results from the FE regressions conrm the results by Bauer (2002) and suggest the validity of the human capital compensation theory. According to this theory, overeducated workers compensate for lower innate ability. With xed eects regressions, I cannot observe non-changers in the context of education, thus I extend the econometric strategy. Using an IV approach, I account for endogeneity of the education variables without the restriction of time-invariance of the educational match. These results reject the compensation hypothesis, whereby over-and undereducation become insignicant and only required education has a positive earnings eect. This nding is supported by regressions using data from the IALS, which includes measures of numeracy and literacy skills among adults and can be used to proxy ability in the OMU framework. The regressions show the robustness of the IV regressions, with required education as only signicantly positive inuence on earnings.
This study contributes to the general discussion about the causal eects of educational mismatch and the mechanisms behind it. The results obtained here refute the compensation theory, as it is rejected by all models but the FE panel model. However, there is a dierent pattern visible in the data. Eliminating unobserved heterogeneity, only the eect of required education remains positive and signicant. This study shows that there is a problem in the German educational system and its link to the labor market. Results show that there is hardly a positive causal eect of overeducation to be found, which means that this additional human capital is unproductive. Overeducation is a common feature of the German labor market with more than 50% of employees in the situation of an educational mismatch. If the additional education is mainly unproductive, this is a massive waste of public resources. Individuals could enter the labor market earlier instead of spending further years in education. While being in education, individuals face foregone wages. This 20 means the direct loss of wages for several years 9 and future pension payments are reduced as the time of contributing to the pension fund is lowered.
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If people are overeducated later, investments in human capital do not fully pay o. In additions to the individual costs of overeducation, there are also public costs to be regarded. Education is mainly nanced by public expenditure in Germany.
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Individuals do not have to pay for their education directly besides the abovementioned foregone wages and as a result, they structurally overinvest in education. The introduction of tuition fees could lead to a better allocation of resources. When not only foregone wages had to be considered but there was a direct price to be paid for education, individuals would consider their investment in education more carefully. Having a clear idea of the occupation they want to work in, individuals could choose their amount of education more purposefully and the likelihood of overeducation would decrease. Due to this, the educational system could be slimmed down, relieving public coers. At the same time, public expenditures could be further reduced as those individuals staying in education would pay for it. As it becomes more likely to nd an optimal job match in the labor market, higher wages compensate for these expenditures. Overeducation plays an important role in Germany showing that there is no general skill shortage in the labor market but an oversupply. Of course this does not rule out the possibility of a shortage of high-skilled individuals in certain elds, but this is not true for the labor market in general. Overall, the allocation does not work perfectly. Over the past decades, skill demand has risen signicantly with the technological development. At the moment, it seems as if the labor market is saturated and the educational system systematically produces overskilled individuals. 9 Mean overeducation in this sample is about 2.2 years for men and 1.6 years for women. 10 The amount of money paid after retirement depends on the time in the labor market. 11 In the early 2000s, some federal states introduced tuition fees for higher education of e1,000 per year. Altough this amount is very moderate compared to tuition fees in most other industrialized countries, the tuition fees were abolished after a few years due to severe student protests. 
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